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Challenges in the Design of Legal Ethics
Learning Systems: An Educational Perspective
MICHAEL ROBERTSON
"[T]he current state of professional ethics instruction leaves much to be desired. In most law
schools, it is relegated to a single required course that ranks low on the academic pecking order.
Many of these courses, which focus primarily (and uncritically) on bar disciplinary rules, constitute
the functional equivalent of 'legal ethics without the ethics', and leave future practitioners without
the foundations for reflective judgment. Although ethical issues arise in every subject, that would
not be apparent from the core curriculum . .."
Introduction
Legal educators who engage in curriculum or subject design in legal ethics are confronted by
many challenges. 2 One concerns the need to be clear about what is meant by "legal ethics" in
the curriculum. What is it that we wish our students to learn, and what is the quality of learn-
ing we require, when we express a commitment to teaching "legal ethics"? This is a challenge
at least because, within the relevant scholarship, there are competing views about the nature
and purpose of legal ethics in legal education. A second but allied difficulty concerns the
question of how to create a learning system that can support the kind and quality of learning
that has been deemed important.
This article, in assuming that learning in legal ethics is a necessary part of law school
education, 3 relies largely on aspects of the work of John Biggs 4 to show how educational
* Associate Professor, Griffith Law School, Queensland, Australia. The author thanks Richard Johnstone and
two anonymous rcfcrccs for thcir commcnts on an carlicr draft.
1 D. Rhode, "If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?" (2003) 72 Fordham Law Review 333, 340, corn
mcnting on American law school cducation.
2 Ethics teaching in law school is challenging for man) other reasons that ma) hav e little to do with the matters
raiscd in this article; scc, for cxamplc, D. L.uban and M. \Lillcmann, "Good Judgmcnt: Ethics Tcaching in Dark
Times" (1995) 9 (eorgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 31; Rhode, ibid; K. Economides (ed), Ethical Challenges to Legal
Education and Conduct (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), Part 2, and cspccially II. Arthurs, "Why Canadian Law
Schools Don't Teach Legal Ethics" 105 and A. Goldsmith and G Powles, "Lawyers Behaving Badly. Where Now
in Legal Education for Acting Responsibly?" 169; A. Evans, "Lawyers' Pcrccptions of thcir Valucs: An Empirical
Assessment of Monash Unixersity Graduates in Law, 1980 1998" (2001) 12 LegalEdacation Review 209.
' It is acknowledged that this view is not univcrsally sharcd. This article makes no attcmpt to cxplorc the basis of
this assumption. See, for example, J. Chapman, "W hy Teach Legal Ethics to Undergraduates?" (2002) 5 Legal
Ethics 68 and A. Boon, "Ethics in Lcgal Education and Training: Four Reports, Three Jurisdictions and a
Prospectus" (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 34.
4 J. Biggs, Teaching for Quality Learning al Uniwersily (Buckingham, Opcn Univcrsity Press, 2003), cspccially
chapters 2 and 3. For a summary of alternatixe theoretical perspectixes on learning goals and their application in
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theory can assist in highlighting and clarifying potential difficulties in the design and imple-
mentation of ethics learning systems in the legal curriculum. More specifically, Biggs's
approach illustrates the importance of formulating ethics learning objectives with particular
care and of ensuring that learning activities, including assessment tasks, are aligned with the
chosen learning objectives.
I begin by outlining key aspects of Biggs's learning theory, and especially the concept of
"constructive alignment". Aside from emphasising the central role of learning objectives in
course design, an integral part of this model of teaching concerns the meaning of learning
itself. Account is therefore also taken of conceptions of understanding and knowledge that
are directly relevant to the design of learning systems. After identifying a number of differ-
ent approaches to legal ethics in legal education, the article explores the levels of learning
implicit, if not explicit, in these approaches. On the basis of the conclusions drawn from the
latter analysis, the article then considers what aligned teaching in legal ethics might mean,
using each of the three approaches to legal ethics as a continuing basis for discussion. Finally,
an attempt is made to establish whether quality learning in legal ethics is a realistic possibil-
ity, given the constraints previously identified. It is argued that quality student learning in
legal ethics is possible and worth striving for, but it is necessary to understand the limits of
what might be learned-and to work to find more effective ways to encourage the quality of
learning that seems important.
An Approach to Teaching in Higher Education
Biggs's approach to teaching in higher education, which will provide the basis for the dis-
cussion and analysis that follows, is located within the constructivist tradition. 5
Constructivism, which has its roots in cognitive psychology, tends to emphasise the idea that
learners create (construct) knowledge through learning activities and their approaches to
learning. It denies that knowledge is "imposed or transmitted by direct instruction". 6
Biggs's theory stresses the importance of "constructive alignment" in teaching. Teaching
will be most effective when there is alignment between "what we want, how we teach and
how we assess". Essentially,
"In aligned teaching, there is a maximum consistency throughout the system. The curriculum is
stated in the form of clear objectives, which state the level of understanding required rather than
simply a list of topics to be covered. Teaching methods are chosen that are likely to realize those
objectives ... [S]tudents ... do the things that the objectives nominate. Finally, the assessment tasks
address the objectives, so that [the teacher] ... can test to see if the students have learned what the
the tcaching of' law courscs, scc M.II. Schwartz, "Tcaching Law By Dcsign: How I.carning Thcory and
Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching" (2001) 38 San Diego Law Rezview 347.
It is acknowledged that constructi ist learning theory Naries according to the nature of the scholarship and that
not all constructivists agrcc on the dctails of Biggs's scholarship, including his cmphasis on the importancc of lcarn-
ing objectiv es. Learning theories more generally are commonly grouped under labels that reflect the orientation of
the scholarship, such as bchavioural, cognitivc and constructivist traditions in cducation. A fourth rcflccts a
phenomenographic framework. It is readily acknowledged that other learning theories might also prov ide a basis for
the kind of inquiry containcd in this articlc.
6 Biggs, supra n. 4, 12 13.
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objectives state they should be learning. All components of the system address the same agenda and
support each other."17
Central to the design of an aligned system are learning objectives. These are specific and
concrete statements8 that signal both content topics and the level of learning required of the
student.9 (In this context, "intended learning outcomes" or simply "learning outcomes" are
meant to convey the same meaning.)10 They are usually to be found in course (or subject)
outlines, or may be expressed as curriculum objectives in faculty documentation that
specifies intended graduate outcomes. Technically, they are not the same as "aims", which
signal more general educational goals. 1
It is important to emphasise, in this conception of teaching, that a learning objective "not
only refers to content topics but contains a criterion for the level of learning required".12 In
other words, in addition to a topic or area of learning, an objective necessarily signals an
expectation of what quality of learning is required. For example, an objective could be "to
identi/.j the rules of legal professional responsibility". This example contains a content topic
and signals a level of understanding-contained in the verb "to identify". Verbs in objectives
therefore signify the "target activities that students need to perform",1 3 which is important
not least because "learning and understanding come from student activity". 14 The choice of
verbs in objectives, thus conceived, is therefore very important.
A verb commonly used in objectives is "to understand". However, "understand" can
mean different things. In the context of legal ethics, does it mean being able to recall and
recite specific rules of professional responsibility (such as those proscribing conflicts of inter-
est), or does it signify a more sophisticated understanding-such as a capacity to apply these
rules in circumstances that apparently warrant their application? Could it even mean, in
addition, the development of an ability to be reflective about and critical of the rules' scope
and utility, which requires an even deeper level of understanding? What these distinctions
suggest is that students might achieve quite different levels of understanding in the learning
process, depending upon the quality of the learning environment. It is therefore no surprise
that educational theorists have expended a great deal of effort in attempting to analyse and
explain them in some detail. 1 S It suffices for current purposes to mention, in simplified
terms, conceptions of understanding and knowledge that together will facilitate the later
discussion.
7 Biggs, supra n. 4, 26.
P. Ramsden, Learning to Tea// im Hig/her dwation (London, Routledge Farmer, 2003), 126, whose scholar
ship is allicd with the phcnomcnographic tradition.
' Biggs, supra n. 4, 43, 44.
10 It is not suggcstcd that thcrc arc not othcr words and phrascs that convcy cxactly the samc mcaning as that
ascribed to "learning objectiv e" in the sense used in this discussion. What is in focus here is an form of written
communication, intcndcd for the bcncfit of all participants in the tcaching and icarning systcm, which spccifics in
unambiguous terms what it is that students are expected to learn.
" Ramsdcn, supra n. 8, 126. Although much has bccn writtcn about the difttcrcnccs bctwccn "aims" and
"objectiv es" and this scholarship has been criticised (eg ibid, 125)-the distinction is not particularly relev ant to
this articc.
12 Biggs, supra n. 4, 43.
I Ibid, 32.
14 Iid, 50.
" Scc, for cxamplc, F. \Larton, G. Dall'alba and E. Bcaty, "Conccptions of I.carning" (1993) 20 Internalional
Journal of Likntational Researh 277.
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The first "taxonomy" provides a framework to conceptualise various levels of under-
standing. The lowest level is labelled "prestructural" (showing "little evidence of relevant
learning") and the highest is called "extended abstract" (involving "conceptualization at a
higher level of abstraction" which "is applied to new and broader domains"). 16 The incre-
mental movement up the scale from the lowest form of understanding (which is undesirable,
if not useless in the context of higher education) to the highest (which is highly desirable) can
also be described as a movement from pre-quantitative through quantitative to qualitative
levels of understanding. This movement also signifies ascending levels of cognitive com-
plexity. Higher quantitative levels reflect increases in knowledge, while higher qualitative
ones signal deeper understandings. Not surprisingly, verbs are key descriptors of these
levels. For example, where quantitative knowledge is sufficient, verbs such as "identify",
"list" and "describe" may be appropriate, even for more sophisticated forms of quantitative
knowledge such as knowledge of theories, for example. At the qualitative levels, verbs such
as "compare", "analyse", "relate" and "apply" signal deeper levels, while "theorise",
"hypothesise", and "reflect" signal the deepest kinds of understanding. 17 Achievement of the
highest levels of understanding is likely to mean that student perspectives, or "conceptions
of phenomena", 8 will have been altered.
A second conceptual framework assists in classifying kinds of knowledge. At the lowest
level, purely "declarative knowledge" involves "knowing about things" and is "independent
of the experience of the learner". At the other end of the spectrum is "understanding of a
higher order", which is "functioning knowledge". This means being able to exercise "active
control over problems and decisions in the appropriate content domains".19 Functioning
knowledge is said to involve a sound grasp of declarative knowledge ("the academic know-
ledge base") together with both the skills ("procedural knowledge") and an understanding of
the circumstances in which one deploys this combination of knowledge ("conditional
knowledge").20 Functioning knowledge depends upon high levels of qualitative understand-
ing (as conceived in the previous taxonomy), and is related to the idea of "performative
understanding". This means that students learn to perbrm their understandings, as opposed
merely to being able to declare them verbally.21 These distinctions in knowledge are import-
ant for educators who need to decide whether students need merely to be able to "know
about" things, or be able to put them to "empowered use".22
In summary, therefore, this model of teaching (1) draws attention to the importance of
being clear about what needs to be learned (both as to "content" and level of learning) and
(2) stresses the need for alignment between learning objectives and student learning activities
(which are generated through teaching), including assessment activities. An appreciation of
potentially different levels of learning, indicated by the use of verbs in learning objectives, is
16 Biggs, supra n. 4, 39-40.
1 Ibid, 38-41 and 47-50. This arrangcmcnt of vcrbs in a hicrarchy that rcflccts asccnding levels of cognitivc
complexity is also functional to systems of grading in assessment, and is referred to as the "SOLO" taxonom,; see
ibid, 29 and 50.
Is Ibid, 36-7.
"' Jbid, 45.
20 Ibid, 42.
21 In spitc ofthc desirability offunctioning knowecdgc, univrsity curricula rcmain "overwhclmingly declarativc,
when really graduates are supposed to be educated so that the) can interact thoughtfully with professional
problems": ibid, 42.
22 Ibid, 53.
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aided by two classifications: the first conceptualises levels of understanding, the other
kinds of knowledge. These two conceptions are closely connected. High-level functioning
knowledge depends for its development upon the prior development of high-quality under-
standings.
What might this model mean for the design of legal ethics learning systems in law school
education, and how might it be applied in this particular context? In the next section I focus
on the difficulty of determining appropriate legal ethics learning objectives, given different
approaches to legal ethics identified in the literature. In the following sections I explore, first,
what levels of learning are implicated in the various approaches and, second, what it might
mean to ensure alignment in legal ethics teaching and learning.
Learning Objectives in Legal Ethics
Being clear about what we mean our students to learn in "legal ethics" is complicated by the
fact that there are competing, and sometimes strongly divergent, views about the nature,
scope and purpose of legal ethics, both as a subject on its own and as a subject that is amenable
to effective teaching and learning in legal education. 23 In order to try to demonstrate this
difficulty, and to facilitate the later discussion, I propose to outline three rather different con-
ceptions of legal ethics for legal education, simplified for current purposes. 24 This is not to
say that there are not other conceptions of what legal ethics in a legal curriculum might
entail,2S or other ways of describing conceptions of lawyering. 26
The first approach, in its most basic formulation, holds that knowledge of professional
responsibility rules27 is in itself a sufficient learning outcome for law students. 2 A slightly
more sophisticated version requires some understanding of the circumstances in which these
rules may apply.29 (This approach, in both formulations, will be referred to as the "rules"
23 See, for example, J. Wcbb, "Being a lawycr/Bcing a Human Being" (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 130, which indi-
cates the depth of dispute between Nirtue and dun ethics at the philosophical leN el and the extent to which this
divide is manifest in contemporary conceptions of lawycring; Boon, supra n. 3, 45.
14 These necessarily superficial accounts are offered as a basis for discussion about teaching and learning issues
onh. No attempt is made to explore their possible philosophical justifications, for which see, for example, Wcbb, ibid.
2' For example, the argument that neither "dun" nor "virtue" approaches to the ethical role of the lawyer go far
enough "to enable us to say what it 'really' means to be a lawyer"; see ibid, 130.
26 C. Parker, "A Critical Morality for Lawyers: Four Approaches to Lawyers' Ethics" (2004) 30 Alonash
UniversiI)y Law Review 49.
27 That is, the rules or principles that purport to circumscribe law) ers' "ethical" behaviours in relation to client
care, conflict of interest, confidentiality and the likc. In somc jurisdictions thcsc norms arc articulated in a rccog-
nisable code, which may haN e been interpreted, augmented, or commented upon b) the courts. In others, the main
source ofthcsc principles may bc casc law, or lcgislation, but that does not cxcludc thc likclihood of somc form oft
code expressing "model rules". See, for example, Law Council of Australia, ModelRules o/.Proessional Conlutt and
Practice (law Council of Australia, 2002).
2, The "rules" approach is clearly evident in Australian legal education: R. Johnstone and S. Vignaendra,
"Lcarning Outcomes and Curriculum Development in Law", IHighcr Education Group, Dcpartmcnt of Education,
Science, and Training, Canberra, 2003, 165 and 118 23; while a Nersion of this approach is reportedly commonplace
in Amcrican law schools, whcrc cthics courscs still "focus primarily (and uncritically) on bar disciplinary rulcs":
Rhode, supra n. 1,340.
29 For cxamplc, the law Society for England and Wales rcquircs that students (at the vocational stage of lcgal
training) be able to "adx ise the client on matters of Professional Conduct and Ethics", suggesting perhaps but not
conclusivcly-that mcrc knowledge ofthc rulcs is insufficicnt: Lcgal Practicc Board, "Written Standards Version
10", September 2004, 15.
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approach.) This version of ethics is usually included in the curriculum to meet the basic
"coverage" requirements mandated by the accrediting body or equivalent. 30 Its theoretical
base is likely to be expressed (if at all) by reference to the traditional assumption that profes-
sional legal ethics amounts to a rule-based morality and that ethical decision-making in legal
practice involves understanding and applying these rules of professional responsibility.
Typically, this approach involves a stand-alone "practice" subject that places emphasis on
knowing about these rules (which express responsibilities to court, client and colleague 31)
and possibly includes other aspects of the "law of lawyering". 32 Usually, it means that little
or no attention is paid to ethical issues elsewhere in curriculum. This single course approach
is justified on the basis that it is better that students engage with these professional require-
ments in one hit or (more controversially) that ethical questions seldom arise in mainly doc-
trinal subjects elsewhere in the curriculum-but, if they do, it is not really convenient to deal
with them in context. Thus, ethics is not seen as a faculty-wide concern or responsibility.
Inevitably, this approach involves teaching (more) "black letter" rules and possibly their
application in decided cases or in hypothetical scenarios. Its treatment is seen as relatively
cheap in school budgetary terms (relative, that is, to an approach that encourages students to
tackle "live" ethical issues in a clinical setting, for example 33).
The second approach places primary emphasis on legal ethics as a skill. 34 (This will be
referred to as the "skills" approach.) It assumes that vocational or professional training is a
necessary part of university legal education. Holding that "competent, ethical practice
requires more than just knowledge of the applicable rules and principles of professional
responsibility", 3 5 it asserts the importance for lawyers of acquiring skills in (1) recognising
and (2) resolving ethical dilemmas. 36 The approach thus focuses both on the rules of profes-
sional responsibility and upon their application in typical ethical dilemma situations. In one
version it is recognised that these rules may have limitations in resolving some ethical dilem-
mas 37 (and in this respect has some common ground with formulations that typify the third
approach, below).
Usually, this approach does not involve a commitment to curriculum-wide teaching and
learning of ethics. Instead, clinical courses are seen to be an ideal setting in which students
can be given the opportunity to confront and engage with typical ethical dilemmas thought
to arise in legal practice. In the more vocationally-orientated formulation of this approach,
30 In Australia, this is commonly referred to as the "Priestly" requirement, after the name of the chair of the com
mittcc responsible for declaring minimum requirements in university legal education. By way of further example,
the Australian "Priestly" requirements concerning professional responsibility hav e recently been reproduced in the
Supreme Court Rules No. 110, 2004 (Queensland) thus: "knowledge of the various pertinent rules concerning a
practitioner's duty to the law, the Courts, clients and fellow practitioners".
31 See, for example, G.E. Dal Pont, Lawyers' Prossional Responsibilij' in Ausraia and New Zealand (Sydney,
Law Book Company, 2001).
32 See, for example, American Bar Association, Standard 302(a)(5), which rctcrs to instruction in "the history,
goals, structure, xalues, rules, and responsibilities of the legal profession".
3 This approach, depending on its purpose and methodology, would more appropriately be classified within
either the second or third approach, below.
W hat seems to be the most comprehensive formulation of the skills approach appeared in American Bar
Association, Legal Education and P rofesional )evelopmwent -In ELinctitonal Conntiuim (Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession, American Bar Association, 1992), 140 and 203-7.
3, Ibid, 207.
36 Ibid, 203-7.
37 Ibid, para. 10.1(b)(xi).
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"ethics" is seen in legal education as part of a suite of marketplace skills (alongside skills in
interviewing, advocacy and legal research) that students must accumulate as they progress
through their studies.
38
The "judgment" approach, for want of a better label, is the most difficult to summarise
because of its diverse scholarship. Indeed, it is probably best described as a collection of
approaches that share some common ground. One common thread amongst most writers in
this tradition is an orientation towards a virtue-based conception of ethical lawyering, in
preference to the rule-based version expressed in the "rules" approach. Some of this schol-
arship, but not all, concerns itself directly with ethics in legal education, 39 as distinct from
legal ethics as a discipline. 40 It is extremely critical, if not dismissive, of the "rules" approach.
While the assumption in the first two approaches is that lawyers' professional responsibility
rules are a complete, or near-complete, answer to the ethical challenges in legal practice, in
the "judgment" approach the scope and utility of these rules is seriously questioned. It fol-
lows that this scholarship, in interrogating what it means to be an ethical lawyer, is also
extremely critical of the "standard conception" position on legal ethics, which (amongst
other things) seeks to absolve the lawyer from moral responsibility for decisions taken in the
representative role.
In the "judgment" approach, much ethical decision-making is seen to be far more complex
and challenging than the "rules" approach assumes. For example, it is thought that the
potential normative content of ethical decision-making extends far beyond the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility (although there is disagreement about just how far4 1). This approach
highlights the importance and frequency of practitioners' discretionary decision-making,
maintaining that the need to make choices, many of which involve ethical or moral questions,
is inevitably if not routinely part of everyday legal practice. 42 Some scholars in this tradition
regard it as essential that legal practitioners develop rather than inhibit their own sense of
morality in order to become ethically astute, and others question whether lawyers' profes-
sional rules have much to do with ethics at all. Some advocate "moral activism" in the
3S See, for example, S. Christensen and S. Kitt, "Graduate Attributes and Legal Skills: Integration or
Disintegration?" (2000) 11 LegalEduation Review 207.
" Amongst the scholarship that directly or indirectly considers legal ethics in legal education arc (in chronolog-
ical order): Luban and lillemann, supra n. 2; D. Rhode, "Into the Valley of Lthics: Professional Responsibility and
Educational Reform" (1995) 58 Law and Contemporary Problems 139; S.G. Kupfcr, "Authentic Iegal Practices"
(1996) 10 Georgetown founal o 'Legal Ethics 33; A Goldsmith, "Heroes or Technicians? The Moral Capacities of
Tomorrow's Iawyers" (1996-7) 14 journal of'Profisional Legal Education 1; Goldsmith and Powlcs, supra n. 2;
W.H. Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering" (1998) 101 Harvard Law Review 1083; W.H. Simon, The Practice
o/jusiie: A Theory o 'Law.yers'Elhics (Cambridge, MA, Iarvard University Press, 1998); A. Iutchinson, Legal
Ethlis and Pro/esional Re.ponsibiht (Toronto, Irwin Law, 1999); D.N. Frenkel, "On Tr)ing to Teach Judgment"
(2001) 12 Legal Jduaiion Review 19; C. Parker, "What Do they Iearn when they Iearn Legal Ethics?" (2001) 12
LegalEdutation Retiew 175; A. Boon, supra n. 3;J. Webb, supra n. 23; Rhode, supra n. 1; and A.M. Lerner, "Using
Our Brains: What Cognitivc Science and Social Psychology Teach Us about Tcaching Iaw Students to \akc
Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices" (2004) 23 Qgunnipait Law Review 643. Some of this literature refers
to, and to some extent criticiscs, an earlier piece by Anthony Kronman, "Iving in the Law" (1987) 54 University of
Chicago Law Review 835.
40 See, for example, the five contributions in Economidcs, supra n. 2, at Part 1, and D. Iuban, "Reason and
Passion in Legal Ethics" (1999) 51 Stanford Law Review 873.
41 Simon, The Practice o/5uslice, supra n. 39 and the critique in Iuban, ibid, especially 888-93.
42 For example, P. Schiltz, "Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the
Moral Formation of thc Novice Attorney" (1998) 82 Minnesota Law Review 705, 713, 719; Hlutchinson, supra n. 39,
chapters 3 and 11.
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lawyer's role, and argue that law students should be given an opportunity to develop this
style of lawyering in clinical settings.
This approach advocates the need for a deep and critical understanding of the lawyer's
role, an understanding that implicates if not requires an ongoing critique of the rules of
lawyering. Ethical competence is connected with and develops from these deep understand-
ings. It involves being constantly aware of one's role as a lawyer and the responsibilities this
role carries. To be ethically astute, lawyers need to develop a capacity for constant and care-
ful deliberation and reflection and need to be able to justify and take responsibility for the
ethical choices that they make. Finally, scholars associated with this conception argue that
ethical questions arise, unavoidably, in every subject in the legal curriculum, and maintain
that a failure to acknowledge and act on this is a serious omission in legal education.
Therefore, opportunities for students to learn about ethical judgment in the lawyer's role
need to be embedded throughout their legal studies.
While these three approaches suggest differing areas of focus, it is also clear that they con-
template different kinds of understanding and knowledge. This variation is most evident as
between the first and third approaches. The differences have implications for the quality of
the learning environment needed to support them. These differences, and their possible
implications, are the subject of the next two sections.
Levels of Learning in Legal Ethics
According to the approach to teaching and learning being relied upon in this article,
teachers need to decide not only what they wish their students to learn, but also the level at
which learning needs to take place. Ideally, these determinations should be clearly reflected
in learning objectives. What levels of learning are implicit in each of these three approaches
to legal ethics in legal education?
Assume, first, the "rules" approach, in which students are expected to acquire "know-
ledge" of seemingly important professional responsibility rules, and (perhaps) to develop
some understanding of the factual circumstances in which these rules are thought to apply,
by reference to decided or hypothetical cases. 43 In terms of learning objectives, the content
area is predominantly about relevant rules and principles to be found in "codes" and case law,
while the level of learning required is indicated by the key verbs implicit in such an approach.
These would appear to be verbs such as "identify" and "describe" (rules or principles),
"recognise" (situations in which the rules have application), 44 and "apply" (as in applying
rules or principles to the facts deemed to be relevant).
If these observations are valid, it can be argued that the levels of learning required of stu-
dents in this instance are quite modest by reference to the classifications referred to above. In
the case of levels of understanding, the verbs "identify" and "describe" suggest learning of a
mainly quantitative variety, although "recognise" and "apply" suggest higher levels of
cognitive complexity. This amounts to a concentration on declarative knowledge, although
4" A standard Australian text, which is an extremely comprehensive treatise on lawyers' professional rcsponsi-
bility rules, epitomises the knowledge base upon which the "rules" approach relies: see Dal Pont, supra n. 31.
4" The ability "to rccognisc" might also be relevant to fact analysis if tcaching and assessment included use of
scenarios in which facts are in issue.
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it might include a very limited form of "performative" knowledge to the extent that students
learn to apply the rules (the knowledge base) in hypothetical circumstances in which they are
thought to have application.
In the "skills" approach students must learn at least to recognise the circumstances in
which typical ethical dilemmas arise and also learn to apply the professional responsibility
rules to resolve them. On one interpretation this is similar to the "rules" approach in that it
places primary emphasis upon the same content area, being professional responsibility rules.
But, the very notion of an ethical dilemma suggests the need to wrestle with something rather
more complex than merely the "issue" that presents itself for attention in the formalist
methodology of the "rules" approach. Furthermore, in perhaps the most well known formu-
lation of the "skills" approach, it is recognised that the "lawyer's personal sense of morality"
has a role in, for example, questioning and seeking guidance "with regard to practices that
are not addressed by existing rules". 45
The levels of understanding in the "skills" approach to legal ethics are evident in the use
of the following verbs: "be familiar", "recognise", "scrutinise", "resolve", "apply", "be
alert", "diagnose" and "research". 46 The first three suggest quantitative levels of under-
standing, but at least "diagnose", "apply" and "resolve" are firmly located in the qualitative
zone of the classification referred to above. In reference to the "kinds of knowledge" frame-
work, this suggests a form of functioning knowledge: having a grasp of declarative knowledge
(the rules of professional responsibility), the knowledge of how to apply the rules, and an
understanding of the circumstances in which they are applied. Thus, this version of the
"skills" approach seems to require competencies by which students are able to perfirm their
understandings, rather than merely being able to declare them.
The "judgment" approach contemplates multiple learning outcomes. While the content
area is "legal ethics", the conception of what this means and implies for legal practice is far
broader and more critically informed than in the first two approaches. In this version of legal
ethics, the declarative knowledge base of the first two approaches is included, but the levels
of understanding go much further. Some of the key verbs implicit in the approach, which
indicate the levels of understanding required, include verbs such as "to theorise" (about the
lawyer's role); "to criticise" (what are thought to be faulty, conventional assumptions about
both the utility of professional responsibility rules and the standard conception of legal
ethics); "to reflect" (upon, for example, what it means to be a good lawyer and to make ethi-
cal decisions in the lawyer's role); and "to justify" (the ethical choices one makes, not only by
reference to the rules of professional responsibility, but by reference to other norms includ-
ing one's own morality).
Although these examples are merely indicative of the level of understanding implicit in the
"judgment" approach, they suggest that in aggregate this approach contemplates sound and
detailed understandings across the spectrum of understandings: at the quantitative phase (for
example, about the meaning and possible criticisms of the standard conception of ethics and
lawyers' professional responsibility rules), through to the full spectrum of qualitative levels
of understanding. Some of these understandings ("to theorise" etc), which are located at the
4 Amcrican Bar Association, supra n. 34, para. 10. 1 (b)(vi) and 204-5.
46 Ihid, 203 7.
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highest-that is, the "extended abstract"-level of the taxonomy referred to earlier 47, envis-
age the learner's perspectives being altered by this depth of learning.
As far as kinds of knowledge are concerned, versions of this approach place emphasis on
the need for students to develop functioning knowledge in the exercise of ethical judgment.
It is helpful to recall here that functioning knowledge, by definition, involves "active control
over problems and decisions in the appropriate content domains", 4s and is arguably a hall-
mark of what it means to perform professionally. 4' However, this is functioning knowledge
that relies on the achievement of high-level qualitative understandings, meaning that it is far
richer, more complex and arguably more valuable (to the prospective lawyer) than that impli-
cated in the "skills" approach. High level learning of this kind might even be seen to involve
the development of moral character itself, s
Aligned Teaching in Legal Ethics
Constructive alignment requires that teaching and assessment "realise" the designated learn-
ing objectives. The key issue for teachers, therefore, is whether they are able to create the
conditions that enable their students to learn what they want them to learn to the level
expected. 5' Furthermore, if the principle of constructive alignment is to be given the weight
it seems to demand, it also follows that the choice of learning objectives should be influenced
if not determined by the availability of teaching and learning activities and assessment tasks
that are capable of supporting the quality of learning envisaged within the objectives one
chooses. In other words, if we are to establish a coherent teaching and learning systems2 in
legal ethics, we should avoid stipulating levels of learning that are unattainable. For example,
we ought not to frame objectives around the development of functioning knowledge when all
we are capable of teaching and assessing is declarative knowledge.
In this section I attempt to identify the kinds of teaching and learning systems that are nec-
essary to support the achievement of the levels of learning identified in each of the three
approaches under discussion.
As a preface to this discussion, it is necessary to repeat the claims, made elsewhere, that
traditional legal education is built upon conservative foundations.' 3 Whatever else this
implies for ethics teaching and learning,' 4 it is certainly arguable that law school teaching has
" Supra n. 16.
48 Biggs, supra n. 4, 42.
49 Ibid, 38: "Predicting, diagnosing, explaining and solving non-tcxtbook problems arc what professionals have
to do." This in olx es "interacting" with problems both "competently" and "thoughtfully".
SSee Ilutchinson, swpra n. 39, 53.
'l On the crucial question of whether law teachers hav e sufficient expertise or commitment to design and imple
mcnt high quality ethics icarning systems see, for example, MJ I.cBrun, "Enhancing Student Learning of Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility in Australian Law Schools by Improing Our Teaching" (2001) 12 Legal
Educalion Review 269, 278-9.
52 Unfortunately, there are other parts of the "system" over which teachers may have no control, such as the
"institutional climate" with its "rules and procedures", which arc a given, and therefore have to be accommodated
and worked around; Biggs, supra n. 4, 26.
'3 For example, see Economidcs, supra n. 2, xvii.
54 Such as the difficulty of establishing sufficient faculty support for ethics teaching and learning, gixen that
teachers arc being asked to cncouragc their students to learn about "lawycring" in a way not traditionally included
in legal education.
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long exhibited a strong tendency towards teaching for declarative knowledge and quantita-
tive rather than qualitative levels of understanding.' 5 These kinds of traditions are evident in
the culture, 6 the typical course learning objectives, and the usual learning activities and
assessment tasks that characterise university legal education.' 7 In their least attractive for-
mulation, they include large classes, lecture-style delivery of information, encouragement of
rote learning of principles and cases, and an emphasis on assessment for grades.' 8 This "tra-
ditional model of legal education" is seen, at least in Australian legal education, to exhibit a
number of dominant and undesirable characteristics. These include a teacher focus (where
the teacher is perceived to be a transmitter of expertise), a concentration on "content know-
ledge" (particularly, rules drawn from case law), the conviction that law is an autonomous
discipline, and a failure to ensure co-ordination between different parts of the curriculum. 5
The "rules" approach to legal ethics, as described above, is located within the traditional
model of legal education. Not only is the focus on (more) rules, but the methodology of prob-
lem solving in matters seen to raise ethical questions tends to mimic that in doctrinal areas
(like contract and tort), in which students are encouraged to apply rules to established facts
in order to find an acceptable answer. The learning environment that would support this
level of learning is commonplace in law school. As they do in other mainly black letter
courses, classroom or "lecture" based activities (with some tutorial sessions for more detailed
discussion and feedback), reading of prescribed materials, mooting (possibly) and traditional,
paper-based assessment items (assignment and examination) of the formative and summative
varieties would collectively constitute the teaching and learning system necessary to enable
students to achieve the required understandings.
At the core of the "skills" approach to ethics is the need to learn to be able to recognise and
resolve the sorts of ethical dilemmas that arise in practice. What sorts of learning opportun-
ities would teachers need to create to enable students (with differing learning styles and
abilities) to develop these competencies? Recognising the existence of ethical dilemmas in
legal practice is often difficult enough: they do not arise, as they do in law school, within care-
fully constructed stories in teaching and assessment materials (in which students expect to
find aspects of the narrative that evoke a sense of quandary). Nor do practice conditions
respect the need for quiet and careful deliberation that, ideally, is required in order to weigh
competing considerations before making a sensible, defensible decision. Furthermore,
making an ethical choice in a legal practice environment when normative guidance is scant or
contradictory and the stakes are real (and high) is not part of the student's experience within
the law class.
Keeping faith with the learning objectives implicit in the version of the "skills" approach
to ethics outlined earlier therefore seems to require a far richer learning environment than
this usual diet of readings, lectures, small groups and traditional assessment tasks can hope
to offer. It is not surprising that it is often thought that this type of "skill" can only be learned
55 With the possible exception of clinical legal education (see discussion below) this tendency remains the norm
despite quite recent moves to locate some legal learning "in context", or to encourage interdisciplinary study, or
cvcn critical and theoretical insights into legal phenomena, processes, and doctrine.
,6 Boon, supra n. 3, 49 53, and Chapman, supra n. 3.
57 M. Keyes and R. Johnstone, "Changing I.cgal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and Prospects for the Future"
(2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537, 541.
S On the limitations of standard law school teaching in American law schools, scc L.crncr, supra n. 39, 681.
19 Keyes and Johnstone, supra n. 57, 539 41.
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beyond the confines of a learning environment that places primary emphasis on declarative
knowledge and quantitative understanding. It is thought that the quality of learning required
here can only be gained through practical experience-and the closest approximation to the
real world of lawyering in law school is the legal clinic.
The scholarship on clinical education makes the claim that clinics give students the oppor-
tunity to perform their understandings in ways that classroom-based learning cannot
emulate. 60 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this claim, it is worth
noting that the case for clinics as sites for deep, authentic learning experiences in legal ethics
would always need to be demonstrated conclusively. Unfortunately, some of the literature
that celebrates the contributions of particular clinics to "deep learning" in ethics provides lit-
tle in the way of hard evidence to back the claims. (Perhaps this also highlights the difficulty
of designing and implementing evaluation systems that provide credible and reliable data on
student learning outcomes in "ethics", particularly at the highest levels of learning.)
Although legal clinics have become far more commonplace in Australian law schools, for
example, they tend to restrict entry to relatively few students, and then only for limited periods
in the curriculum. (How much clinical exposure is needed to develop in students the compe-
tencies that the "skills" approach really requires? To this we probably do not have a ready
answer.) 61 It is also the case that legal clinics typically envisage numerous learning outcomes,
meaning that exposure to ethical dilemmas together with opportunities to confront and grap-
ple with them may constitute a small part of the student's clinical experience. And even if eth-
ical dilemmas do frequently arise in clinical settings, high quality learning outcomes in ethics
cannot be guaranteed; presumably, they are more likely to be achieved when the learning envi-
ronment is crafted to ensure that students engage with these with the level of attention that
they require. To some extent, this will depend upon the quality and quantity of supervision
available. Finally, because clinics are seen to be expensive to run, as compared with traditional
law courses, it is safe to assume that the learning opportunities they offer will continue to be
rationed into the foreseeable future. For this reason alone there are doubts about the extent to
which clinics can be relied upon to provide quality learning opportunities in legal education
generally, and in the development of ethical competencies in particular.
As suggested earlier, the "judgment" approach to legal ethics suggests a variety of learn-
ing outcomes. Many of these are higher-order ones, as measured against the scale that
classifies levels of understanding. For example, understandings that enable students to crit-
icise, hypothesise and theorise about the lawyer's professional and ethical role are highly
qualitative, and should also provide the foundations for the development of functioning
forms of knowledge. 62 In theory at least, there is no reason why these qualitative levels of
learning are not attainable in law school education, even within the constraints that often
exist. 63 (This matter is discussed further in the next section.)
60 Iuban and \illcmann, supra n. 2, 40; Kupfcr, supra n. 39, 112; Boon, supra n. 3, 60-3; N. Gold, "Educating
the Complete Law er: Clinical Legal Education for Every Law er", paper presented at the Third International
Journal of Clinical Iegal Education Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 13-25 July 2005, in which it was claimed
that clinical legal education provided learning opportunities for the cultivation of "sentient, thoughtful, caring,
principled, and skilful" lawyers.
61 The McCrate Report recognised that, in relation to developing skills in recognising and resolving ethical
dilemmas, "exposure in law school clinical programs or classrooms is necessarily very limited"; American Bar
Association, supra n. 34, 332.
62 Biggs, supra n. 4, 42.
63 In relation to Australian legal education, see Keyes and Johnstone, supra n. 57, 554 6 and 559 61.
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However, to the extent that the "judgment" approach envisages the development of
"moral character and good judgment", 64 suggesting the development of functioning or "per-
formative" knowledge at a sophisticated level, the prospects for creating a learning environ-
ment to support these levels of learning are far less clear. Learning activities that enable
students to "realise" performative understandings of this kind would, presumably, need to
lead students into a series of particular and authentic legal judgment learning experiences 6'
that might be described in the following manner. Students would need to be faced with
dilemmas that (a) actually confront their moral/ethical sensibilities in a way that excludes
superficial responses as viable options and (b) require them to enter reflective and delibera-
tive decision-making processes that (c) comprehensively draw upon substantial reservoirs of
prior learning, insights and critical faculties in reaching a reasoned decision and (d) sub-
sequently enable them to experience and evaluate the consequences of the decision that is
ultimately made so that (e) they are better equipped to engage in this process when the next
learning opportunity arises. Put this way, it is doubtful that the methodology of contem-
porary legal education (with the possible exception of the clinic) is able to produce and sus-
tain the quality of learning environment that this level of commitment to performative
understanding would entail.66 This issue is considered further in the next, and final, section.
Aiming for Quality Learning in Legal Ethics
The aim of the article to this point has been to explore the teaching and learning implications
of potentially different approaches to legal ethics, by reference to Biggs's model of construc-
tive alignment. Through the use of this model it has been possible to find some answers to
important questions about the design of legal ethics learning systems: what students might
be expected to learn about; what levels of learning are involved; and what kinds of learning
environments are needed to support the approaches taken. I now propose, in the light of the
preceding analysis, to make some observations about whether, and to what extent, quality
learning in legal ethics remains a realistic objective in law school education.
While the "rules" approach to legal ethics is certainly an option, 67 it has attracted sub-
stantial criticism within the relevant literature. 68 For example, there are reasons to reject the
64 For example, Hutchinson, supra n. 39, 53.
65 Scc, for cxamplc, lutchinson, supra n. 39, 52-5 for a strong vcrsion ofthc argument that only "learning by
immersion in practical situations" will enable students to dev elop moral character and good judgment.
66 But scc, for cxamplc, an account otattcmpts to teach "judgmcnt" to a class of 100 students: D.N. Frcnkcl, "On
trying to Teach J udgment" (2001) 12 Legal Edcation Review 19-45. Although there is some guidance in the litera
turc on teaching and assessment practices that support diftcrcnt vcrsions of thc "judgmcnt" approach, these arc
difficult to find. Few contributions appear to concern themselxes explicitly with educational theory and insights. For
an cxccption to this tcndcncy, scc Parkcr, supra n. 26. For a particularly strong claim that the lcgal clinic is the only
site in which "legal ethics that incorporates ... moral judgment" can be taught, see Luban and Millemann, supt,
n. 2, 40.
67 With some Nariations, it happens to be the choice of man) Australian and American law schools.
6S For cxamplc, Rhodc, supra n. 1, 33-43; 1lutchinson, supra n. 39, chaptcr 2; Kupfcr, supra n. 39; Wcbb, supra
n. 23; Boon, supra n. 3, 58 on the limitations of studying lawyers' codes in isolation; R. Granfield, "The Politics of
Dccontcxtualizcd Knowlcdgc: Bringing Context into Ethics Instruction in Iaw School" in K. Economidcs (cd),
Ethical Challenges to LegalEduation and Conduct (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998), 299, 308 14; and more recently,
S.J. Lcvinc, "Taking Ethical Discrction Scriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation" (2004) 37 Indiana
Law Review 21.
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assumption that ethical decision-making by lawyers necessarily has a great deal to do with
lawyers' rules and codes of responsibility,69 although these are undoubtedly an important
source of guidance (to the extent that they provide guidance). Arguably, lawyers inevitably
make choices (often in private) over a multitude of questions concerning whom to represent,
and how to represent their clients, and much choice-making extends far beyond the rules'
apparent yet often uncertain compass."' Moreover, the reproduction of conventional, for-
malist and formulaic black letter techniques as a device to solve complex ethical issues is seen
to be wholly inadequate, if not potentially dangerous, in a zone of individual decision-making
that is often fraught and challenging. Put in the context of the learning theory referred to
above, this approach to legal ethics typically involves a level of learning in the quantitative
rather than qualitative zones of understanding and therefore appears, also from this per-
spective, to be of questionable educational value.
The "judgment" approach, by contrast, represents the most ambitious of the approaches
identified. That is not to suggest that it is without its critics, who regard an orientation to
virtue ethics rather than rules-based ones as dangerous territory for lawyers and their
clients. 71 However, a considerable body of contemporary scholarship supports a far more
extensive and critical orientation to ethics in lawyering and in legal education, 72 and for this
reason alone legal educators cannot lightly dismiss the claims, insights, concerns and argu-
ments contained within this scholarship. 73 The "skills" approach, in the formulation relied
upon earlier, is similar to versions of the "judgment" approach in that it contemplates the
development of functioning, in addition to declarative, knowledge. But the scope of its
declarative knowledge base-that is, the emphasis largely on an understanding of the rules
of professional responsibility-appears to be far more limited than that envisaged in the third
approach.
Is it realistic to aim for quality learning in legal ethics, given the realities of the law school
context? A number of observations can be made. Given the apparent limitations of a "rules"
and "skills" approach to legal ethics, these observations assume a preference for learning out-
comes connected with a more expansive approach to legal ethics in legal education. They also
rely on, or are connected with, the approach to teaching and learning adopted for this article.
Perhaps a sensible way to begin to answer the question about whether it is possible to aim
for high quality learning outcomes in ethics, given the realities of law school learning sys-
tems, is by reference to the distinction between declarative and functioning knowledge. This
distinction provides a basis upon which to recognise what it is that we can, with sufficient
attention and planning, comfortably encourage students to learn about in legal ethics and
what is altogether more challenging.
Declarative knowledge is concerned with knowing about things. It includes propositional
knowledge, that is, public knowledge that can be accessed and learned by students through a
69 Simon, The Practite ofjastice, supra n. 39, 3; Hutchinson, supra n. 39, 41.
7' For example, I Hutchinson, supra n. 39,48; Schiltz, swpra n. 42, 713, 719; and, generally, I.uban and Millcmann,
supra n. 2. And see D. Wilkins, "Legal Realism for Law) ers" (1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 468, 469 70 on the
view that these rules can be manipulated towards desired ends.
71 For recent critiques see, for example, 1'. Dare, "Virtue Lthics and Legal Lthics" (1998) 28 Victoria Univen'it3'
ofWellinglon Law Review 141 ; and Wcbb, supra n. 23, 134-6.
72 See supra n. 39.
7' There arc, it must be noted, significant differences within this body of work; see, tor example, I.uban, supra
n. 40 and Hutchinson, supra n. 39, especially chapters 2 and 3.
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variety of activities. 74 However, this does not mean that it is necessarily quantitative know-
ledge, although much of it may be. Declarative knowledge can also include the deepest
qualitative understandings, which result eventually in students being able to analyse,
criticise, generalise, hypothesise and theorise. 7S Therefore, even if we are limited mainly to
having students learn to declare their knowledge rather than, through experience, learning to
perform it, this does not preclude the achievement of high quality understandings. As indi-
cated earlier, understanding of this quality, concerning (for example) the lawyer's ethical role
and responsibilities, can be supported within the typical learning systems within law
schools-but only if they are designed carefully. This point is taken up again below.
Functioning knowledge, on the other hand, whose acquisition is conditional upon the
prior development of understandings to qualitative levels, is "within the experience of the
learner" and it enables the learner to perform these understandings while engaging with and
resolving unique professional problems. 76 A well-developed functioning knowledge in ethi-
cal decision-making is, in addition to being dependent upon qualitative understandings in
the declarative knowledge base, deeply personal and can, arguably, only be developed under
learning conditions that replicate the actuality of ethical quandary in legal practice settings. 77
With the possible exception of the clinic, there are reasons to doubt that the learning systems
of the typical law school are able to provide the opportunities to develop this kind of know-
ledge, rather than knowledge that is not truly performative.
78
In summary, students can develop understandings about the ethical dimensions of lawyer-
ing first at quantitative levels, and subsequently develop these through to the highest quali-
tative understandings; but they cannot ordinarily be expected to develop high level
competencies in ethical decision-making itself (the "performative" kind of knowledge)-
unless, that is, they have opportunities to engage in learning activities that are likely to assist
them in developing this kind of knowledge. However, because we cannot be absolutely sure
about the limitations of the law school learning environment, we need to leave open the pos-
sibility that at least some students-given their unique abilities and learning styles-will
begin to develop their "ethics" knowledge to performative (in addition to declarative) levels,
despite any apparent limitations in the learning opportunities that they encounter. Whether
or not learning outcomes such as these are plausible, what seems crucial, following Biggs's
classifications and theory, is that the first responsibility that rests on legal educators is to cre-
ate the conditions necessary to enable students to develop their "ethics" understandings to
the highest levels of declarative knowledge. The latter, it will be recalled (again following
Biggs) is a precondition for the development of functioning knowledge itself.
This leads to the question of how these qualitative understandings about the ethical
dimensions of lawyering might be encouraged. In other words, by what means should stu-
dents be encouraged to reach the understandings that involve the ability to analyse, reflect,
criticise, justify and theorise about the lawyer's ethical role, after learning how to identify,
" Biggs, supra n. 4, 41.
7'Ihid, 43.
76 Id, 42; emphasis added.
77 For example, Hutchinson, supra n. 39, 53-4.
71 In the theory adopted by Biggs, a less wcll-dcvelopcd form of knowlcdgc involves the combination of dcclar-
atixe knowledge and "procedural" knowledge (having the skills to apply knowledge), but without "conditional
knowledge" (having a fully developed sense of thc circumstances in which to use procedural knowledge); Biggs,
supra n. 4, 42.
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describe, recognise and explain in relation to more traditional aspects and conceptions of
ethical lawyering? The primary argument that follows concerns the need to design for incre-
mental legal ethics learning across the legal curriculum.
A convincing case for the need to visit the ethical dimensions of lawyering throughout the
legal curriculum, and not merely in a single course or subject, has previously been made in
American legal education.' 9 In spite of the difficulties associated with the implementation of
"pervasive ethics" in that context,8 0 the case for learning about ethics throughout the legal
degree remains overwhelming. One or two courses in ethics, for the most part disconnected
from the remainder of the curriculum, is simply inadequate if students are to achieve high
quality learning outcomes in ethics; in other words, it is essential to ensure-in the view
being taken here-that ethics learning remains alive throughout the student's studies.
However, the argument here is not only that ethics learning objectives should occupy mul-
tiple sites throughout the curriculum (because that is precisely where they belong), but that
these sites of learning should be carefully designed to ensure that students are given the
opportunity to build incrementally on their understandings as they progress through their
studies. (Biggs's taxonomy of levels of understanding, referred to earlier, 1 provides one basis
for modelling this approach.) This means that, initially, students should have opportunities
to develop and increase their quantitative understandings of aspects of legal ethical issues and
then, in stages, to build on and deepen their previous understandings through to the highest
qualitative levels.82 In other words, increasingly sophisticated levels of understanding in
ethics should be planned for, so that students encounter deeper and richer learning oppor-
tunities as they progress through their degree programmes.
There are different ways in which this progression could be structured, but it would
inevitably require a great deal of planning and attention across the entire curriculum.
Undoubtedly, a proposal such as this would present a major challenge within the culture and
practices of the typical law school. However, a possible construct to aid the goal of incre-
mental learning in ethics is what may be called a "vertical subject".8 3 The vertical subject is
a continuing one that would progress throughout the programme in a carefully structured
way. It would intersect with and reside within various courses in each semester or year of the
programme. The levels of understanding contained in ethics learning objectives would
7' D. Rhode, "Ethics by the Pervasive NMcthod" (1992) 42 ]ournal ofLegal Educalion 31.
80 See, for example, the comments in Rhode, supra n. 1, 340; and D. Rhode, Proessionaille.sponsibihty: Ethi" by
the Pervasive Aelhod (Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1994), xxix, despite the merits of thc "pervasive"
approach being extensiv el) argued: for example, Rhode, supra n. 79.
S Biggs, supra n. 4, 38-41.
82 Following Biggs's approach to teaching and learning, there is a question about the utility ofunstrucumred "ethics
by the pervasive method" approaches; that is, an approach that fails to (1) spccihN ethics learning objectives with the
clarity that the) demand and (2) align teaching/learning and assessment tasks with the objectives. It has been
pointed out that "all too often" the claim of pcrvasivc ethics falls far short of what is really required, which-in these
authors' N iew requires careful preparation and dedicated classroom time: Luban and lilleman, supra n. 2, 39. It
seems possible, thercorc, that one reason why the pervasive approach to legal ethics has apparently not worked is
because curriculum planners, in paying insufficient attention to educational theory, have assumed the achiexement
of student learning outcomes that were either not expressed clearly enough in learning objectives, or were not
supported b) the learning activ ities and assessment practices that such objecti es require, or both.
"3 This label was developed during a series of curriculum review discussions in the Griffith Law School,
Queensland, Australia, in 2004. The author of this article was a member of the committee. The collectiv e contribu
tion of thc committee members in developing the notion of thc vertical subject in the context of thc Griffith Law
Curriculum is acknowledged. See also Christensen and Kilt, supra n. 38; Keyes and Johnstone, supra n. 57, 559.
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increase in complexity from one host subject to the next. Points of co-existence with other
subject areas would be determined by the extent to which practice in those substantive areas
unavoidably implicated enquiries about both the role of the lawyer and ethical decision-
making in particular. Moreover, in each site in which the vertical subject co-existed with the
traditional subject area, ethics learning objectives, teaching and assessment within the host
subject would need to be carefully aligned.8 4
Student performance in assessment tasks, together with subsequent evaluation of all
aspects of students' experiences of the vertical subject, would reveal the extent to which the
desired learning outcomes, at each stage of the vertical subject's intersection with the host
subject, were actually being met. If not, adjustments would need to be made to increase the
likelihood that students make the connections between the different levels of learning and to
improve prospects for the incremental learning that is desired. In theory, this model will
encourage students progressively to deepen their understandings from quantitative levels to
the highest qualitative ones by the time they complete their legal studies, and provide them
with the best possible foundations to develop their ethical competencies to functioning
knowledge levels as they enter the vocational stages of their careers-whether these be in
legal practice or elsewhere.
Conclusion
The argument for a "vertical subject" in legal ethics can be seen in a broader legal education
context. Reference was made earlier to what has simply been described as the traditional
model of legal education, which exhibits a number of tired and troubling characteristics.ss
The authors of a recent assessment of Australian legal education have examined the extent of
change in the sector over the last few decades and have concluded that, despite the rhetoric,
such changes that have occurred are not profound ones, and many problems associated with
the traditional model have not been fundamentally addressed. There are, moreover, contin-
uing impediments that effectively thwart the kind of transformation that is so clearly needed.
These include the legal academy's (continuing) subservient relationship to legal practice and
the profession, and the "general lack of awareness of or concern for the educational literature
[and] its implications for teaching practices".8 6 Despite this sometimes gloomy assessment,
there are some reasons to be optimistic about the prospects for transcending the traditional
model. Opportunities clearly exist for reform-minded teachers to devise and to experiment
with fresh initiatives in law school teaching, especially if the particular institution recognises
the need for innovation in legal education. But if legal curricula and teaching and learning
strategies are to be "renovated" to the extent necessary, a number of issues will need to be
addressed. These include the development of a truly student-focused approach to teaching,
which requires a far greater commitment to the development of learning activities that
84 This also means that, just as traditional subjects/courses have conxenors, so should the xertical subject. One
of the responsibilities of the vertical subject convcnor would be to work collaborativcly with "host" subject
conxenors to ensure that ethics learning objectives are appropriately formulated, that teaching and assessment
arc aligned, and that learning outcomes and students' experiences ofcarning in the vertical subject arc effectively
evaluated.
" Supra, text at n. 57.
86 Keyes and Johnstone, supra n. 57, 554-5.
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encourage quality learning, and recognising the merits of a co-ordinated approach to
curriculum design, in the interests of incremental student learning opportunities in areas
such as legal ethics.
87
It seems to be implicit in most arguments for ethics learning in law school that the quality
of legal education would be improved if students learned a great deal more than they
currently do about the meaning, significance, frequency and potential complexity of ethical
decision-making in the lawyer's role-together with the responsibility that this decision-
making carries. Current scholarship on legal ethics in legal education suggests that there is
also a steadily growing view that the legal academy has a special responsibility to do far more
than it previously has to produce graduates who are better equipped to handle the consider-
able ethical challenges of contemporary practice. Yet, the place, scope, content and method-
ology of legal ethics in legal education remain far from settled, and there is evidence to
suggest that the achievements in legal ethics learning among law schools that do teach in the
area still leave much to be desired. Part of the challenge to encourage higher quality learning
outcomes in legal ethics-assuming that such a goal remains a priority in the changing world
of tertiary legal education-must surely involve much more attention to fundamental ques-
tions about whether, and how, we can hope to create the learning environment necessary to
support the quality of learning deemed necessary. This means that learning theory must have
a prominent role in providing the insights and direction that this ongoing project requires.
87 Ibid, 558 61.
